Michigan Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 4

1941

WILLS - LEGACY TO CREDITOR - PRESUMPTION OF
SATISFACTION OF DEBT
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, WILLS - LEGACY TO CREDITOR - PRESUMPTION OF SATISFACTION OF DEBT, 39
MICH. L. REV. 677 (1941).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol39/iss4/26

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

677

WILLS LEGACY TO CREDITOR PRESUMPTION OF SATISFACTION OF
DEBT Plaintiff, a bank employee and personal friend of the testatrix, ren-

dered to her and her late husband frequent and considerable services in connection with the management of their property. He received no compensation for
these services, but both wife and husband indicated that he was to be compensated in the will of the survivor of the couple. There was evidence that the
amount of such compensation was to be as much as $12,000. Actually, plaintiff
received about $3,000 by the wife's will. It was not indicated in the will whether
or not the legacy was intended to satisfy the indebtedness. Plaintiff now claims
$ro,825 for his services in addition to the legacy. Held, one jµstice dissenting,
the legacy was given in satisfaction of the debt, and the additional claim must
be disallowed. In re Estate of Cooke, 207 Minn. 437, 292 N. W. 96 (1940).
In reaching its conclusion th~ court applies what it calls the "pro tanto"
rule, stating that a legacy to a creditor is to be applied as a satisfaction of the
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indebtedness, unless otherwise indicated in the will itself.1 Although the majority
holding does not seem unjust on the facts of this case,2 the rule employed is open
to some criticism. 8 Generally the courts will merely presume that a legacy given
by a debtor to his creditor is in satisfaction of the debt, 4 and will allow the presumption to be rebutted by a showing of any factors which indicate that the
testator in fact intended that the legacy should be a bounty. These factors have
in effect become standardized in most jurisdictions. 5 The theory of the courts
in applying the presumption is that "a man is presumed to be just before he is
generous." 6 The effect of the decision in the principal case is to strengthen
the presumption, while the general trend, on the other hand, has been toward
finding more exceptions to its application. As the dissenting justice in the principal case points out, 7 even the general rule is unpopular with the courts and
they will "take hold of any slight circumstance to avoid its operation." 8 A few
courts have gone· so far as to repudiate it entirely and to adopt the so-called
1 The court stated the proposition as follows: "where services are rendered upon
the understanding that they are to be compensated for by testamentary disposition, the
value of a legacy, unless otherwise stated in the will, shall be applied upon the reasonable
value of such services. . . ." Principal case, 207 Minn. at 440.
2 Assuming that plaintiff's claim was excessive to the extent of $7,825.
8 In laying down an arbitrary and conclusive rule of law, and in disregarding the
many generally recognized exceptions applicable to this case, the court in the principal
case goes further than most have gone. One justice, however, felt that there should be
no fixed rule, but rather a rebuttable presumption; he concurred in the result because
he felt the intention was clear.
4 Doty v. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co., 146 Wash. 95, 261 P. 788 (1927); annotation, 86 A. L. R. 6 (1933), and cases there cited.
5 Among the circumstances in which the rule is not applied are the following:
when the legacy is of a different nature than the debt; when either the debt or the
legacy is uncertain or contingent; where the will directs payment of legacies and debts,
or of debts alone; where the legacy and the debt are payable at different dates; where
the will expresses the purpose of the legacy; where the debt is contracted subsequent to
the execution of the will; where the debt is unliquidated or on an open and running
account; where the debt is based on a commercial instrument transferable by the legatee
in the testator's lifetime; where the debt is for trust funds; where the legacy is not as
beneficial as the debt in amount, certainty, value, and time of enjoyment; where the
legacy is given to a third person. See cases cited in dissenting opinion, in the principal
case. See also the excellent and thorough analysis, with complete citation o·f cases, in
86 A. L. R. 6 at 18 (1933).
6 Byrne v. Byrne, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 54 (1817); annotation, 86 A. L. R. 6 at
12 (1933); 3 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 14th ed., § 1478 at pp. 137-138
(1918).
7 In a strong opinion, based partially on a different interpretation of the facts, the
dissenting justice called attention to the unsoundness, unpopularity, and frequent circumvention of the rule. He warned the court that it was placing itself in a dilemma
by adopting a rule which often defeats the testator's intention.
8 2 PoMERoY, EQUITY JuR1SPRUDENcE, 4th ed., § 528 (1918); 2 VA. L. REv.
63 at 66 (1914); 86 A. L. R. 6 at 15 (1933). In Cloud v. Clinkinbeard's Executors,
8 B. Mon. (47 Ky.) 397 (1848), an action in assumpsit against an executor for services
rendered to the testator by a legatee, the court rejected the defense of presumption
of satisfaction on the ground that it was purely an equitable rule.
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"modern rule" by which the intention of the testator becomes the controlling
factor. 9 The principal aim of all will construction is to give effect to that intention.10 Since the normal understanding is that a legacy is intended to be a
bounty,11 it would seem that the burden of proof should actually be placed on
those who claim that the legacy was intended to be a satisfaction. So to place
the burden is to reverse the old presumption, and that is the practical effect of
the modern rule. The desires of the testator would seem more likely to be
fulfilled by the adoption of a presumption so directed as to resolve doubts in
favor of the normal "bountiful" interpretation of the legacy, but flexible enough
to allow a contrary intention of the testator to be proved and carried out as
far as rules of evidence will permit.12

9 In re Estate of Herb, 163 Misc. 441, 296 N. Y. S. 491 (1937); White v.
Deering, 38 Cal. App. 433, 177 P. 516 (1918); annotation, 86 A. L. R. 6 at 17
(1933); ATKINSON, WILLS 721 (1937).
10 Annotation, 86 A. L. R. 6 at 7 (1933).
11 3 SToRY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 14th ed.,§ 1478 (1918).
12 2 PAGE, WILLS, 2d ed., § 1375 (1926). See also note on same case in 89
UNiv. PA. L. REv. 132 (1940).

